Maritim security

“South East Asia Maritime Security Challenges: Indonesian Perspective”.
(Presented at NADI Vietnam, Hochimin City, 19-22 April 2010, by Dr. A. Y.Antariksa)
First of all, I would like to express my sincere gratitude and appreciation to The Institute for Military Strategy, Ministry of National Defence of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam for organizing this important NADI meeting to all ASEAN Institute and Security Studies in order to established Confidence Building Measure at this Region.
The title of my presentation is “South East Asia Maritime Security Challenges: Indonesian Perspective”.
Measure the importance of maritime security
Presentation Outline
I. Measure - Importance of Maritime Security at South East Asia.
II. Maritime Security Challenges.
III. Examine - Regional Initiatives and Mechanisms.

Part 1 Measure the importance of maritime security at South East Asia

The importance of maritime security can be measured in terms of vital interests. Security is recognized as the protection of vital interests in order to maintain acceptable quality of life. So….what is the maritime issues that impact vital interests? Factors that impact vital interests in terms of economic prosperity, territorial integrity and human security or QOL. Also, there are main players that have a major impact on the domain in this region.

Southeast Asia is home to important sea-lanes and straits, including the Malacca Straits, one of the busiest waterways in the world. Over half the world’s commercial shipping passes through these SLOCs each year, more than 90,000 ships, which includes 80% of the oil transported to Japan and China. The traffic volume. Which totals 525 million metric tons worth about $390 billion dollar…makes the Malacca Straits in particular, the busiest straits in the world? , and it is likely to be even busier in the future because of the increasing trade flow and energy demands in Asia. By 2020, numbers are expected to surge to over 150,000 vessels each year.

Additionally, many other vessels, including fishing boats, passenger vessels, and pleasure craft ply the region’s watersGoods are moved via major shipping lanes or SLOCs.
Depicted in this chart is the most direct route from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific. # 1 identifies the Straits of Malacca - a narrow 500 nm stretch of water between Malaysia and Indonesia island of Sumatra. Another route is the Sunda Straits - #2 connecting the Java Sea to the Indian Ocean. This straits narrowness and shallowness and lack of accurate charting make it unsuitable for current large ships. #3 points to the Lombok Strait located between the islands of Bali and Lombok in Indonesia. The 4th significant sea lane is the Makassar Straits located between the islands of Borneo and Indonesia.

On The Economic prosperity
• Some of the world’s busiest ports are also located in Southeast Asia or rely on maritime traffic through the region’s waters. Singapore harbour, for instance, has the largest container turnover rate in the world after Hong Kong, followed by the Chinese ports of Shanghai and Shenzhen. Many of the ships bound for these ports, or other major East and Southeast Asian ports, transit Southeast Asian waters.
• international sea borne trade, maritime annual growth all in Asia. Another important point is the revolution in shipping industry: Largest ships carry,
• to meet growing trade demands, the merchant fleets of the world are expanding.
• Oil tankers and dry bulk carriers


South East Asia also rich in oil, gas, sea bed mining and resources. Another factor which underlines the importance is marine resources. Regional Countries are increasingly looking towards possible oil and gas reserves and other mineral resources beneath the sea for future economic security, along with fisheries which remains the staple food source and revenue for many countries in the region.

Territorial Integrity
Overlapping claims to explore new reserves has fostered competing maritime ambitions and focused attention on territorial and maritime boundary disputes.
To better understand the issues surrounding these boundaries, I display these key terms of reference governing maritime zones.

• First are territorial seas – waters of sovereignty for coastal states - extends to 12 nms from baselines. Ships of all states enjoy the “right of passage” through territorial seas – but such passage shall be continuous and expeditious – no stopping or anchorage. Passage is innocent so long it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal state.
• Next is the contiguous zone – area between 12 and 24 nautical miles – the coastal state is given special rights – for example the right of coastal states to intercept vessels suspected of smuggling people, goods, arms, or WMD into its territory.
• The Exclusive Economic Zone OR EEZ is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, extending to 200 nms. As the name suggests, the rights of coastal states consist of sovereign rights to explore and exploit the natural resources of the EEZ. It has jurisdiction over fishing and other economic activities in the EEZ. Freedom of other states is limited to freedom of navigation and over flight.
• An area not depicted on this chart, but of significance to the geography of the South East Asia - is archipelagic waters. The first important point is the right that allows states that are constituted wholly by archipelagos to draw baselines connecting the outermost part of these islands, of which territorial sea and beyond are measured, e.g. in example in SE Asia would be Indonesia & ROP. The second point is that all ships and aircraft enjoy the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage – similar to rights of passage in territorial sea.
• Finally, there are the high seas OR intl waters - beyond the outer limits of the EEZs of any state. These waters are not subject to a claim of sovereignty by any State. Every State has the right to sail ships flying its flag on the high seas.


Maritime Boundaries
• Maritime Boundaries are represented in the context of UNCLOS – the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. This is a large and complex convention that provides the constitution for the oceans and the basis for jurisdiction. This convention sets out the rights and duties of a state with regard to the uses of the oceans and prescribes the regime of maritime zones that grants States sovereignty rights over ocean spaces and resources.
• Perhaps there is no other region in the world where the enactment of the (UNCLOS) plays such a key role in relations between countries. UNCLOS is considered the most important framework for regulating freedom of the seas and managing marine resources. Not only does it provide clear provisions on territorial waters and EEZs, which before this convention were long standing controversies…it also provides certain rights to landlocked countries– providing access to the sea and potential share of surplus resources of adjacent EEZs.
• Most territorial disputes occur because of overlapping claims under UNCLOS. On this slide, the dark blue in the chart represents territorial sea and the medium blue depicts EEZs – As you can see, many overlapping areas among nations.
• Correspondingly, disputed boundaries impacts navigation regimes and fisheries, which I’ll examine in the analyses and assessment of transnational treats and issues.
Human Security And Quality Of Life.

• Finally, the importance of maritime security can be measured in terms of human security and quality of life.
• For example – let’s take the case of APEC and South East Asia economy oil dependency. First it is important to recognize that although the South East Asia region and APEC have five of the 10 largest crude oil producers APEC oil import dependency is expected to rise from 36 percent in the case of APEC Energy Let’s look at one In the case and the case of oil demand
• Increasing energy demand, environmental degradation to the marine environment, and the cultural affinity due to the geographic nature of the region. All important aspects affecting people’s quality of life.

Blue Water Navies
• Growth in influence is a key factor, which plays out by blue water navies expanding their forward presence.
• China depends on freedom of the seas as a continuing source of trade and investment so critical to its modernization goals. As part of their maritime strategy, China is enhancing its economic, political and defense relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations ( Bru, Camb, Indon, Laos, Mal, Brun, ROP, Sing, Thail and VN.) or ASEAN ….AND establishing a string of pearls for its navy along the major sea lanes carrying its oil from the M. E. through the Malacca and Singapore straits.
• This string of pearls describes China’s efforts to increase access to ports, develop special diplomatic relationships, and modernize military forces that extend from the South China Sea across the Indian Ocean and on to the Arabian Gulf.
• Each “pearl” in the “String” is a nexus of Chinese geopolitical military presence. Starting with Point 1 - Hainan Island, recently upgraded military facilities. An upgraded airstrip on Woody Island at point 2. Construction of a deep water port in Sittwe, Burma shown here as point 3 is an adjoining “pearl,” as is a container shipping facility in Chittagong, Bangladesh at pt 4. The last point reflects the most advanced and largest project, the construction of a navy base in Gwadar, Pakistan. For China, the strategic value of Gwadar is its 240-mile distance from the Strait of Hormuz. China is funding a majority of the $1.2 billion project and providing the technical expertise of hundreds of engineers. Since construction began in 2002, China has invested four times more than Pakistan and contributed an additional $200 million towards the building of a highway to connect Gwadar with Karachi.


Interests
• Along with China, India is re establishing itself in the region. Primary areas of interest range from the Persian Gulf to the Antarctic and from Cape of Good Hope to the Straits of Malacca, and through Southeast Asia. Major interests that shape their maritime strategy include protecting seaborne trade, energy security and under seas mineral resources. India sees its Navy and Coast Guard as the major stabilizing forces in the movement of energy across the Indian Ocean. Of the latter, India imports nearly all its needs for cobalt, nickel and copper. Consequently, the plentiful under-sea resources of the scarce mineral form an important national interest. Also, Maritime diplomacy plays an important role as an essential component of India’s “Look East” Policy – Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam etc….. Some view this development as being encouraged by Japan and U.S. as a counterweight to China forward presence.
• Japan depends heavily on the straits and the South China Sea as routes for its oil imports and has long been active in assisting littoral countries in ensuring freedom of navigation throughout these SLOCS.
• For Australia, maritime forward presence is primarily aimed at promoting stability and good governance in the South Pacific
• For the U.S., PACOM addresses maritime security with allies in the region to deny terrorists transit and sanctuary at sea. U.S. efforts are also aimed at building regional capacity and strengthening multilateral cooperation among the littoral states to this aim.


Part II Maritime security Challenges

Now I want to shift to assessing Part II: Maritime Security Challenges. The continued growth in international commerce has been accompanied by growth in the use of the maritime domain for criminal and terrorist’s purposes. Estimated future maritime security challenges faced by ASEAN range from transnational threats, including maritime terrorism, sea piracy /sea robbery, illegal migration, refugees/human trafficking, assistance during natural disasters, smuggling, illegal fishing, pollution and destruction of the ecosystem, have spawned a multitude of additional “out of area” operational roles for regional navies, and have dramatically increased the maritime security challenges of the South Asian region.
Incidents of piracy, maritime crime, and terrorism tend to be concentrated in areas of heavy commercial maritime activity, especially where there is significant political and economic instability in the region and little or no maritime law enforcement capacity.
Terrorism in the maritime domain provides opportunities to cause significant disruption to regional and global economies. Some terrorist groups have used shipping as a means of conveyance for positioning their agents, logistical support, and generating revenue.


Also to Review and assess key: Maritime Security Challenges At south East Asia

A primary issue always being assessed by maritime protectors is choke points connecting these SLOCs. In particular, areas between Singapore and Darwin, Australia…. and the straits between the Indian and Pacific Ocean constitute the most significant bottleneck in the world.
Again, over half the commercial shipping of the world passes through this area each year, a huge economic impact if access were restricted. And as this slide reveals, in the lower right hand corner red circled, the most confined point is in the Singapore Straits where, at its narrowest point in the passage is a bare 600-800m wide.
• What is worth pointing out is highlighted by the second and third bullets in this slide.
• A real and credible threat. In particular, International Atomic Energy Agency warns that as many as 30 countries could soon have technology that would let them produce atomic bombs in a very short time, always with the potential to export technology.

Secondly WMD

• The real challenge with (Weapon Mass Destruction) WMD in this domain is the traffic flow in which to track shipping AS some 18 million total containers make over 200 million trips per year on the high seas. For the past ten years, demand for cargo capacity has been growing almost 10% a year. There are ships that can carry over 11,000 TEU ("Emma Mærsk", 1,300 feet long), and designers are working on freighters capable of 14,000 TEU. At some point, container ships will be constrained in size only by the Straits of Malacca, one of the world's busiest shipping lanes. There are plans underway for a quarter-mile-long ship, called the Malacca-Max, targeting a capacity of 18,000 containers (for scope, it would take $1 billion in cargo down with it if it sank).

Thirdly, Significant transnational threat– Maritime Terrorism.
• I narrow the definition for the purpose of analysis in the maritime domain. Just to remember Maritime Terrorism can be happen again at any time.

• As for maritime terrorism, only half a dozen or so groups have developed maritime attack capabilities. I will highlight two prominent ones – first - LTTE.
• The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam or LTTE as many of you know is a militant organization that has been waging a secessionist campaign against Sri Lankan govt since the 1970s with the purpose of securing a separate state for the Tamil majority regions in the north and east of Sri Lanka. AND is proscribed as a terrorist organization by 32 countries
• This is one of few terrorist groups with domain expertise. LTTE has been able to build a robust maritime infrastructure through a procurement network in Europe & Australia to procure and ship dual-user technology and weapons. Their capabilities include underwater demolition teams, strike groups, engineering and boat-building units, logisitics support teams, reconnaissance and intelligence sections.
• Sea Tigers - an amphibious warfare unit focusing on utilization of naval firepower and logistics, mainly consisting lightweight boats. The LTTE continuously attacks shipping off the coast of Sri Lanka by blowing ships up or by acts of piracy. Attacks on the USS Cole off Yemen and piracy off the coast of Somalia, possibly copied the LTTE tactics.

• Al Qaeda is the other significant terrorist organization that threatens the maritime domain. They have used trawlers and other vessels to transport arms, ammunition, and explosives from country to country. Both the Cole and Limburg attacks in Yemen. Execution phase – 30 minutes.
• Although AL Qaeda has demonstrated a maritime capability, I would say that they do not possess a permanent and robust infrastructure dedicated to maritime ops. Unlike LTTE, Al Qaeda has neither a blue or brown-water fleet. And although roughly two dozen ships over the past couple years have been linked to Al Qaeda support or activities by the intelligence communities, to date no ship have been intercepted transporting weapons in the A-P region.
• And lastly Somalia High Jacking that possibility followed by another countries.

Maritime terrorism in Southeast Asia
• In SE Asia, terrorist groups listed in this slide have committed acts of piracy primarily for the purpose of funding more lethal, shock events. For example, the Free Aceh Movement – which was a separatist group seeking independence for the Aceh region of Sumatra fm Indonesia. , but has since surrendered its separates intentions and dissolved its armed wing following 2005 peace agreement with Indonesian govt.
• Another example is the Moro Islamic Liberation Front or MILF which is a Muslim separatist rebel group located in S Philippines. Accuses PI army of crimes against Muslims. AND the Largest separatist group in PI.
• The picture on this slide reveals the terrorist actions of the Abu Sayyaf –a militant organization based in southern Philippines seeking a separate Islamic state for the country’s Muslim minority. In Feb 2004 the group planted a bomb in the tourist compartment of Super Ferry 14, steaming between Manila and the southern Philippines. The explosion and subsequent fire killed 118, which remains the worst maritime terrorist attack in history.

So what to look out for? – I would say that terrorists groups primarily exploit the maritime domain for support, not offensive operations. Compared to air and land transportation, the threat from terrorism to naval ships and commercial shipping is considered medium to low for two reasons. First, very few groups possess the capabilities or expertise to attack maritime targets. Most of these groups do not have access to large boats or ships that can operate outside territorial waters. Second, unlike the aviation and land transportation domains, the maritime domain naturally does not constitute high-profile national symbols that draw extensive publicity and fear such as threats to airports and train stations.
• As to floating bombs – for example the LNG threat - LNG tankers do not present particularly good terrorist targets. Reason being is that in the transportable liquid state, LNG is not explosive. Only when LNG is heated and becomes a gas, and is unconfined, is it explosive. Natural gas is only flammable within a narrow range of concentrations in the air (5%-to-15%). Less air does not contain enough oxygen to sustain a flame, while more air dilutes the gas too much for it to ignite.
• The more credible threats are those that have the potential to create world news coverage, economic impact, and high shock value, such as cruise liner bombings, mining of choke points, liquid propane carriers or suicide bombers.
• When LPG (liquefied petroleum gas, or propane) tanks are engulfed in a fire, they explode in a devastating manner, called a BLEVE - boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion. The explosion occurs because the top of the tank becomes very hot and weakened then the high pressure fuel inside causes the tank to rupture and explode with a significant footprint of devastation in any hub port. The economic Impact of closing a hub port in the global trading system is significant. It is estimated that closing the hub port of Singapore could easily exceed $200 billion US dollars a year, or U.S. port approx a billion $s a day.

Illegal Trafficking And Smuggling.
• Another threat to human security in the region has been illegal trafficking and smuggling. I would say this will remain a major challenge and an important factor that will continue to affect maritime security for the foreseeable future.
• Reasons being - these crimes at sea are invariably transnational in nature w/ more than one national jurisdiction involved…THUS…Enforcement can be very complex – nationality of vessel, victims, location – can all be different & jurisdictional competence varies in different regions.
• The foot soldiers in this threat are mainly fisherman and unemployed
• Potential for terrorists to take advantage of human smuggling networks in attempts to circumvent border security cannot be ignored.
• As security in ports of entry, at land-borders, and at airports tightens, criminals and terrorists will likely consider undefended coastlines for unlawful entry.
• Many countries face difficulties in combating these threats due to a shortage of trained personnel, lack of modern equipment and inadequate national legislation.

Piracy And Robbery
Pirates still menace the world’s shipping, and the SE ASIA region is no exception.
• The intl community recognizes two intl agencies in assessing these transnational threats.
• First is the International Maritime Bureau whose responsibilities lie in fighting crimes related to maritime trade and transportation, particularly piracy and in protecting the crews of ocean-going vessels. (Founded in 1981) is a specialized bureau of the International Chamber of Commerce. It publishes a weekly piracy report and maintains a 24-hour piracy reporting centre in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Endorsed by the UN's International Maritime Organization, and has observer status with Interpol.
• IMB defines piracy as – an act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with the intent to commit theft or any other crime w/ intent to use force.
 Another definition used to assess this threat comes from the IMO, established by the UN. The UN established the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in 1948. IMO's main task is to develop and maintain a comprehensive regulatory framework for shipping to include safety, environmental concerns, legal matters, maritime security and the efficiency of shipping. Based in the UK
 The IMO defines piracy as any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends DIRECTED on the high seas, in a place outside the jurisdiction of any state; against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; against a ship, aircraft, persons or property
• Many attacks take place in ports and harbors OR when ships are underway in confined waters. Includes kidnapping and ransom of crew &vessel, hijacking, sale of cargo, ship given new identity.


Most acts cited in the annual IMB reports on maritime piracy are not the classic boarding and hijacking of a merchant vessel on the high seas. For example, nearly two-thirds of the attacks in 2003 occurred while the ships were stationary in port and are better classified as sea robbery

• Two recent cases of piracy in the SE region
• First a motor tanker was on a routine run with a cargo of palm oil in the Malacca Straits, bound for the port of Belawan-located on the northern coast of Indonesia. When men armed with automatic weapons swarmed aboard from a speedboat and imprisoned 13 crewmembers and demanded $50,000 ransom from the ship’s owners for the crew’s release. After a five week standoff, the pirates shot dead four crewmembers and the remaining nine jumped overboard to escape.
• In the second case, armed pirates in three fishing boats boarded a Japanese-flag ocean tug towing a large construction barge bound for Burma in the Straits of Malacca. They kidnapped the Japanese Master and two engineers. Later, the Royal Malaysian police patrol boats escorted the tug and towed the vessel to Penang. The crew was held for a week before its release and a ransom was allegedly paid by the owner of the tugboat for their release.
http://www.icc-ccs.org/prc/piracy_maps_2006.php
This chart highlights Piracy and Armed robbery reported by the IMB from Jan to Sep of 2006. Of note, the most significant number of cases has taken place in
Chittagong anchorage, Bangladesh (33) // and (40) Indonesia: Belawan, adjacent to Jakarta
…..READ ANALYSIS bullets……
• The Good news is this threat is declining. A positive outcome is that the Lloyds of London War Risk committee has decided that the Malacca Strait is no longer a "war zone." The "war zone" designation, with its inevitable effect on insurance rates was made in June 2005. The War Risk committee had decided the war risk rating was merited because of endemic piracy, the presence of Islamic terrorist cells and a separatist insurrection in Indonesia's Aceh province. Since then, however, littoral states Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore have mounted effective joint naval operations against pirates and other threats.

But operations remain expensive and the three governments are suggesting shipping companies pay a toll to cover the costs of keeping the strait safe, which is estimated at ~ 300 million US dollars a year to enhance safety. Initial shipping company opposition has dwindled as the realization has firmed that they are going to have to pay some form of insurance and it might as well be of the preventative variety.

Issues: Energy Resources

. Another source of dispute involves potential energy resources. Spratly Islands is home to a number of territorial disputes, both bilateral and multilateral. Sovereignty is contested for oil and gas resources. Estimates vary considerably, from low of 1-2 billion barrels to a high of 225 billion.
The islands are composed of apprx 170 bits of land of which only 36 can be called islands, because they are naturally above water at high tide. WHERE Six govts make claims to these islands – China, Taiwan, and Vietnam lay claim to virtually all the geographical features. The Philippines and Malaysia lay claim on the basis of proximity to the continental shelf principle***. This principle is based upon the CONVENTION ON THE CONTINENTAL SHELF. DONE AT GENEVA, ON 29 APRIL 1958 referring (a) to the seabed adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea. If the coastal State does not explore the continental shelf or exploit its natural resources, no one may undertake these activities, or make a claim to the continental shelf, without the express consent of the coastal State. Brunei claims one island. All accept Brunei has sought to consolidate its claims by occupying geographical features. One major military clash has resulted – between China and Vietnam back in 1988 – where over 70 VN were killed.
• Another dispute exists over Ambalat as a result of overlapping exploration licenses of competing oil companies in Indonesia and Malaysia. located of the east coast of Borneo. Unlike the Spratlys though, the dispute is non-territorial in nature, and the parties are concerned not with sovereignty of land, but with overlapping claims within the EEZs in which they have specific sovereign rights.
• In the S Pacific there has been much political and legal debate over the allocation of exploitation rights to the area with Australia, Indonesia and East Timor all claiming rights to a proportion of the resources.
• In the south, with Australia, Indonesia and East Timor, each country’s claims could be argued under international law. This matter has been resolved by establishing the Joint Petroleum Development Area (JPDA) under the Timor Sea Treaty signed in 2002. The Treaty allocates 90 per cent of the revenue from the area to East Timor and 10 per cent to Australia. The resources in the JPDA amount to almost 12 trillion cubic feet of gas and 900 million barrels of oil. Oil is currently being processed and exported from the JPDA. The majority of the gas resources, are still in the development phase. These gas deposits will have a significant impact on the region’s petroleum industry. Australia stands to gain $4 million a year from Greater Sunrise and $2 billion in total revenue from Bayu Undan. Depending on how the area is further developed, downstream financial benefits to Australia could be as much as $25 billion, including the provision of up to 20,000 jobs in the Northern Territory. The resource sharing arrangements under the Timor Sea Treaty will underpin East Timor’s economic development for the foreseeable future and are therefore vital to this region.

Issues Disputed Waters

• Shifting to some of the key issues.
• First….. disputes over who owns what sections of the seas. W/ numerous islands and overlapping EEZs and territorial seas in the S E, many boundaries require three or more countries to agree.
• For example in Southeast Asia, of the nearly 60 maritime boundaries in the region, less than 20% have so far been fully agreed, with little progress being made on the outstanding ones.
• And w/o full agreement…. cooperative enforcement is certainly complicated.

Issues With Marine Resources
A main issue with Marine resources is the future sustainability of fisheries – obviously important to the livelihood and economic prosperity for many S-E countries and cultures. Unsustainable exploitation of fish resources has become a serious problem as countries compete against each other for economic growth. Issues of overfishing in territorial waters and EEZs has been compounded by the illegal fishing activites carried out by boats belonging to foreign countries, and flying the flag of another country.

One example of a major source of tension is between Thailand, Burma and Indonesia where there exist disputes over fishing permits, foreign exchange and restricted areas.
One example is disputes over the rights to exploit highly migratory fish stocks in intl waters – like the blue fin tuna. Japan, Australia, and New Zealand are embroiled in disputes over the Southern blue fin tuna. While Australia and NZ impose a restriction on the amount of tuna that can be caught annually to build up stock, Japan argues that its quota should be increased.
On impacting the environment, coastline and riverside deforestation has led to erosion and increase in sediment flowing into rivers and the seas, which has led to degradation of habitat. Is also being impacted by shipping pollution caused by ship ballasts water.


Challenges: Gaps
• Other issues equally important, but I would say are more challenging to overcome are the gaps in cooperation, capabilities and enforcement. Coastal states, which once were under Colonial domination jealously, guard their sovereignty and jurisdiction in the maritime zone. This has resulted in reluctance by many in the A-P region to authorize warships or govt ships of other States to patrol or exercise other police powers in their territorial seas. Thus, I would hazard to say any proposals for cooperative arrangements on maritime security are unlikely to be acceptable to some States in this region if they conflict with the sovereignty and jurisdiction of coastal states.
• Another point to make is that ASEAN is still a relatively loose regional organization compared to IOs in other regions – like the EU, particularly in the area of security. A-P has no region-wide and binding security arrangement equivalent to Organization for Security and Coop in Europe (OSCE) or any collective security pact similar to those that exist in NATO. Many believe this is due to the region’s great diversity and underlying mutual suspicions. Despite the many bilateral and regional cooperation initiatives, security coop is much more difficult to carry out. Notwithstanding, cooperation can be agreed upon on issues they do not impinge on existing territorial claims.
• Equally challenging security is that most maritime security and defense forces lack the capabilities and capacities to maintain timely and accurate maritime situational awareness
• Lack automatic tools to identify and prioritize relevant and actionable information to avoid information overload•
• Particularly, the inability to acquire, fuse and manage information sharing (technical, cultural) barriers limit the effectiveness of partner
• The end result is missed opportunities for interdicting terrorists, WMD proliferation, piracy, trafficking and smuggling
• I would also say there is a significant gap in ENFORCEMENT – Combined, these shortcomings impact enforcement. Although there are exists numerous conventions governing activities, enforcement is problematic Further, for most of this region, there are no clear guidelines on pursing suspect ships crossing into another territory.

Part III: Regional Initiatives and Mechanisms
So what measures and initiatives are being taken by countries and international organizations?
• By IOs, an ASEAN Work Program, adopted in 2002 includes agreements to eliminate piracy and promote info sharing about piracy. This program asks member states to disseminate laws, regulations, agreements, and conventions, and to cooperate with UN agencies and the IMB and IMO.
• Another IO initiative comes from the ASEAN Regional Forum OR ARF who recently (Jan 07) hosted the first ever ARF Maritime Security Shore Exercise which promoted interoperability and familiarity amongst the various agencies involved through a series of inter-agency discussions and table-top exercises. (ASEAN +Aus, Can, China, EU, India, Jpn, NKorea, SKorea, Mongolia, NZ, Pak, PNG, RU, US)ARF has Russia) most recent initiative took place in Singapore this past January, where Singapore Maritime security experts from the military, law enforcement, port and policy agencies of ARF member countries participated
• At the UN level – as explained in the discussion on Piracy threat, the IMO maintains a regulatory framework for maritime security.
• In the context of multilateral agreements, one ratified last fall is the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia. This is the first multi-lateral government-to-government response of its kind that addresses the challenge of piracy and armed robbery in the context of 3 pillars: info sharing, capacity building and cooperative arrangements among ASEAN+6 countries. (Bangladesh, Korea, SriLanka, Burma, Japan, India) As part of the information exchange process, the ReCAAP includes the establishment of an information sharing centre in Singapore.
• Another agreement to address these threats is In March 1988 a conference was held in Rome in which the IMO assembly adopted the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, which extends the rights of maritime forces to pursue terrorists, pirates, and maritime criminal into foreign territorial waters and also provides for their extradition and prosecution. Its main purpose is to ensure that appropriate action is taken against persons committing unlawful acts against ships. These include the seizure of ships by force; acts of violence against persons on board ships; and the placing of devices on board a ship which are likely to destroy or damage it. (Interesting – 133 contracting states. Minus Laas, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Thailand Malaysia, Nepal Timor, Solomon Islands
• Of symposiums in the theater, the Western Pacific Naval Symposium brings together 18 member navies to promote mutual understanding among navies and increase cooperation by providing a forum leading to common understandings was created in 1988 and (Aus, Bru, Cam, China, Fr, Indon, Jap, Mal, NZ, PNG, PI, Rus, Sing, S Kor, Thai, Tonga and the U.S.) Administrator is PACOM. Aim is to discuss issues and generate a flow on info.

Mechanism
• Listed here are some of the mechanism exercised to mitigate threats:
• Proliferation Security Initiative OR PSI is one example of cooperation, providing authority to board sea vessels suspected of carrying illicit shipments of WMD destruction, their delivery systems, or related materials. Under this agreement, if a vessel registered in a partner country is suspected of carrying proliferation-related cargo, either one of the Parties can request of the other to confirm the nationality of the ship in question and, if needed, authorize the boarding, search, and possible detention of the vessel and its cargo. 70 countries support aims of PSI. 20 members – 6 in A-P Aus, Thai, Sing, Ru, Japan and U.S.
• The Intl Ships and Port Facility Security Code OR ISPS came into effect in 2004 as a comprehensive set of measures to enhance the security of ships and port facilities. It covers ships of over 500 gross tons on intl voyages, & port facilities serving these ships. It was initiated by the US Coast Guard under the direction of ADM James Loy, as part of the US government's response to the September 11th Terrorist Attacks. And mobile offshore drilling units AND requires that ships and ports carry out security assessments, plans, appoint security officers and maintain certain security equipment. As of Oct 2006 total number of declared ISPS port facilities amounted to 10,652 worldwide. (contracting govts to (SOLAS – Safety of Life at Sea Convention – important intl treaty for safety of merchant ships)
• Along the same lines the CSI program offers its participant countries the reciprocal opportunity to enhance their own incoming shipment security using intelligence and automated information and pre-screening those containers that pose a risk at the port of departure before they arrive at ports. The Container Security Initiative (CSI) was launched in 2002 by the U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP), an agency of the Department of Homeland Security. Its purpose was to increase security for container cargo.
• The last one I’ll mention is similar in concept to aircraft IFF tracking. The Automatic Identification Systems AIS is now mandated by the IMO for all vessels greater than 300 gross tons. Like aircraft IFF, this system identifies the vessel, owner, flag position, course and speed and is available to anyone who wants to subscribe to the service.
• Of note, Singapore has taken these mechanisms one step further in synchronizing this info thru what’s called a Vessel Traffic Management Information Systems (VTMIS)…which is simply an integration and synchronization enabling operators to manage vessel traffic, monitor the environment and support port and harbor resources.

• The final group of mechanisms worth citing are the multilateral training and operations ongoing aimed at increasing readiness of maritime forces operating in the region.
• Southeast Asia Cooperation against Terrorism, OR SEACAT exercise is a headquarters staff exercises involving scenario-based crisis-action planning and decision-making & fleet training exercise involving the movement and reactions of real-world forces such as boarding teams practicing their skills. Was started by the USN began in 2002 and has evolved into three phases. First - A command post exercise (CPX) Second phase is the FTX or in response to other real-world forces, finally the third phase is the Hotwash or exercise debrief, to discuss lessons learned to help develop planning guidance for next year's exercise.
• An example of multilateral surveillance operations take place in the Straits of Malacca under the umbrella of the Malacca Straits Security Initiative, which employs ~20 ships from Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia AND Eyes in the Sky which focuses on conducting maritime air patrols by littoral countries. encompasses both Operation MALSINDO or as listed on this slide - Malacca Straits Patrols
• Pacific Partnership 2007 was officially launched June 1 as USS Peleliu (LHA 5), a multimission amphibious ship, departed Pearl Harbor for Southeast Asia and Oceania. The four-month humanitarian mission brought together host nation medical personnel, partner nation military medical personnel and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to provide medical, dental, construction and other humanitarian-assistance programs ashore and afloat in the Philippines, Vietnam, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and the Marshall Islands.

• Finally US Pacific Fleet emphasizes regional security through an international cooperation of Maritime Domain Awareness. MDA simply understands all activities, events and trends within the maritime domain. The role of MDA is to identify the threats and maintain a complete situational awareness of the vessels that engage in intl commerce, fishing and transport – basically an air traffic control system for the maritime domain.
• Again, these are just a few examples of international cooperation to enhance transparency, share information and take action against threats in the maritime domain – which are all geared to strengthen maritime security in the Asia Pacific.
• IF TIME ALLOWS……..I close this session w/ one more initiative created by our friends in Malaysia in 2006 –Malaysia has launched a new coastguard to combat piracy in the Malacca Straits.


Common Challenges
Transnational in nature Ignore political boundaries, the agenda has moved from traditional concern such as piracy and armed robbery to non-traditional concern such as terrorist activities drug and weapons trafficking, smuggling of goods and people, illegal fishing and environmental degradation.
Maritime security threatens the economic growth and welfare of the ASEAN member countries and their people.
Countering these threats and challenges requires consistent cooperation between the states affected and the associated maritime agencies. With Spirit of ASEAN, supported ASEAN Security Communities

Possible area of cooperation
Possible area of cooperation among ASEAN militaries to manage threats: enhanced information exchange., interagency cooperative frameworks through bilateral / regional arrangement., implementation of international laws and standard of security measures such as ISPS code., strengthen capacity of national law enforcement.
Possible area of cooperation in maritime security are combat the illegal activities, such as piracy, hijacking, smuggling, illegal fishing, illegal logging, shifting border poles, and illegal border crossing

Operational Solutions: Coordinated Patrol among Navies, hot pursuit arrangement, developing standard operational procedures and inter-operability, exchanges in port security measures, the use of advanced technology, establishment of Maritime Electronic Highway (IMO and World Bank sponsored), establishment of Auto Track Information System (AIS) for ship DWT 300 GT, establishment of focal points, tactical training and exercises.

In summary –key takeaways to bear in mind. In particular, the first five checkmarks point to the importance in terms of economic security, territorial integrity, and human security. Further, I expect transnational threats in this domain, such as illicit trafficking, piracy, terrorism, and gaps in cooperation, capabilities and enforcement to endure. Finally, to address these ongoing challenges I expect a constant and perhaps increasing regional especially ASEAN commitment by both intl organizations and nations to address to cooperate and build the trust and confidence among the players in the region to address these gaps and strengthen security.
 Very dynamic maritime security scene
 Increasing reliance on seaborne trade
 Growth in naval forces to safeguard sea lanes
 Limited maritime boundaries, capacity, and effective cooperation arrangements
 Degradation of marine habitats
 Enduring transnational strategic threats
 Implementation challenges of management regimes/protocols continue
 Regional commitment to strengthen relationships and cooperation undermining sovereignty
 Need ASC SOP
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That’s all my presentation, Any Question.
Presentation at Track II Network of ASEAN defence and security institutions third meeting